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TERRY V. OHIO IN HINDSIGHT: THE 
PERILS OF PREDICTING THE PAST 
Susan Bandes* 
Making a hit list of wrongly decided cases is fun and easy: 
mine includes Ex parte McCardle, the Slaughter-House Cases, 
Younger v. Harris, McCleskey v. Kemp, DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, Bowers v. Hardwick and 
others too numerous to mention. At first, I fancied that tracing 
the consequences of their obliteration would be easy too. I was 
sure I could show, for example, in straight linear progression, 
why Hans v. Louisiana should never have been decided, and 
how only good consequences (greater government accountability 
and a far more cogent eleventh amendment jurisprudence) 
would have followed. At the time, that seemed almost too easy, 
and so I decided to play the game using what seemed a harder 
case: Terry v. Ohio. 1 Now that I have given substantial thought 
to the possible consequences of Terry's obliteration, and have 
immersed myself in chaos theory for nearly a week,2 I suspect 
that the argument in the other cases would have been more 
complex than I originally thought. As to Terry, the complexity 
of the analysis is daunting. It raises questions about many 
things: from the ways in which law professors use knowledge 
from other disciplines, to the feasibility of hindsight analysis, to 
the interactions among the many complex systems affected by 
constitutional rulemaking. 
It's a tough call whether to obliterate Terry. The question 
can't be whether Terry was correct when decided, because there 
is no way, from our current vantage point, to ignore more than 
thirty years of evidence about how it has worked in practice. 
* Professor of Law, DePaul University. I would like to thank my brother, Ken 
Bandes, for illuminating discussions about chaos theory, and Jim Chen and Tracey 
Maclin for very helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
I. 392 u.s. 1 (1968). 
2. Surely sufficient time for a law professor to become proficient at a highly com-
plex field of which she knew nothing previously. 
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The rules of this game don't deprive us of our historical knowl-
edge (indeed time travel was specifically mentioned) so the 
question must be: in light of what we know now, would we have 
been better off without the Terry decision? The question is 
complicated by the fact that during the time we were accruing 
evidence about the effects of stop and frisk, we were also gaining 
a less linear, more sophisticated understanding of the laws of 
cause and effect. 
Chaos theory studies the behavior of dynamic systems, or 
systems that are not in constant equilibrium. It posits that in 
such systems, cause and effect are not linear or proportionate-
instead, seemingly minor causal agents may lead to dispropor-
tionately major effects. The connection among forces in a sys-
tem may even appear random, though over time more complex 
and subtle patterns may appear. But even these patterns will not 
be exactly duplicative because each recurrence takes place in a 
different environment. Moreover, individual systems do not ex-
ist in isolation, but are themselves part of a complex environ-
ment that is in a continual state of flux. Changes result from the 
interaction of many forces that are constantly changing, as are 
the interactions among them. 3 
It does seem that chaos theory offers some important les-
sons here. Take the question: what would have occurred if Terry 
had never been decidedt Several interdependent systems 
would be affected by this disturbance.5 But before reviewing all 
the possible interactions, let's examine the choices before the 
Supreme Court in 1968. 
Terry v. Ohio was widely viewed as a compromise. Civil 
.libertarians had urged the Court to keep in place the traditional 
Fourth Amendment structure, which required that searches and 
seizures be accompanied by probable cause and either a warrant 
or an exception to the warrant requirement.6 This path would 
most likely have meant holding stops and frisks invalid, since 
police with probable cause could simply arrest and perform a 
3. James Glcick, Chaos: Making a New Science (Viking, 1987); Vincent Di 
Lorenzo, Legislative Chaos: An Exploratory Study, 12 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 425, 430-31 
(1994). 
4. I am assuming that the rules don't permit the more satisfying alternative of as-
suming that Terry had been decided differently. 
5. Or lack of a disturbance, depending on one's chronological vantage point. 
6. Sec brief of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. as amicus 
curiae, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Brief of American Civil Liberties Union et al., as 
amici curiae, Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. (1968). 
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more intrusive search incident to arrest.7 The Court's solution8 -
bringing the practice within the Fourth Amendment by severing 
the warrant clause from the reasonableness clause and holding 
that certain categories of police conduct need only be reason-
able-was billed as a middle ground between the civil libertarian 
position and the position that stops and frisks weren't Fourth 
Amendment activity at all. 
Thirty years later, there is widespread disagreement about 
whether Terry succeeded.9 Although there are strong arguments 
on either side, I find this a much easier question than the ques-
tion of whether some other course would have succeeded better. 
Terry has not succeeded. It has had the salutary effect of clari-
fying that stop and frisk is regulated by the Fourth Amendment, 
and therefore subject to judicial review. 10 However, the nature 
of the judicial review contemplated-deferential review of dis-
cretionary, low profile, street level decisions according to a mal-
leable balancing standard-was poorly suited to achieve the de-
sired result of creating clear guidelines for the use of stop and 
frisk. In many ways, Terry has given us the worst of both worlds. 
Terry was intentionally more like an opening salvo than a blue-
print.11 It offered little guidance about what sorts of police con-
duct would be permissible and coupled the lack of guidance with 
a new broad permission to balance public safety against the 
rights of suspects. As Wayne LaFave said at the time, the deci-
sion "[left] room for later movement in almost any direction." 12 
It should come as no surprise that such movement by the lower 
courts, prosecutors, police, and even the Supreme Court itself 
7. As Tracey Maclin correctly points out, stop and frisk would likely have contin-
ued under any circumstances, but absent Terry, its fruits would have been inadmissible. 
Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Dis-
cretion, 72 St. John's L. Rev. 1271, 1287 (1998). 
8. Supported by the Brief of the National District Attorneys' Association, as ami-
cus curiae, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
9. Sec generally the superb symposium at 72 St. John's L. Rev. (1998), and com-
pare Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 St. John's L. 
Rev. 911 (1998) with David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: 
Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 St. John's 
L. Rev. 975 (1998). 
10. Although it isn't accurate to say that stop and frisk would have been entirely 
outside the judicial purview absent Terry, just that there would be no uniform Supreme 
Court standard. 
II. In counterpoint to Miranda. See John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk 
Cases: A Look Inside the Supreme Court's Conference, 72 St. John's L. Rev. 749, 789 
(1998) (citing comments of Justice Fortas memorialized in Justice Douglas' conference 
notes about Terry). 
12. Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Pe-
ters and Beyond, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 40, 46 (1968). 
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has been inexorably away from Terry's narrow holding and to-
ward increased police discretion. 
At the same time, the Court'itself began using Terry's bal-
ancing test as a means of adopting more sweeping rules permit-
ting whole categories of conduct to be investigated under the 
Terry criteria, rather than under the traditional Fourth Amend-
ment requisites of probable cause and a warrant. Thus the leg-
acy of Terry is a doubly unfortunate one. Judicial review has not 
succeeded in controlling the widespread abuse of stop and frisk/3 
the vast brunt of which falls, as it did in 1968, on minority sus-
pects.14 Whatever the result of declaring stop and frisk unconsti-
tutional or of refusing to review its constitutionality might have 
been, the result of Terry was to legalize and place the High 
Court's imprimatur on a practice that serves as a tool to harass 
and abuse minority citizens. In addition, the doctrinal basis the 
Court used to achieve its "narrow" holding in Terry has inexora-
bly expanded to permit numerous police practices to flourish, 
unaccompanied by probable cause, a warrant, or, in many cases, 
any level of suspicion at all.15 
But this kind of armchair quarterbacking16 is easy. The far 
harder question is whether we would be better off now if Terry 
hadn't been decided. I've come to believe, partly aided by chaos 
theory, that the question may be an incoherent one. Or perhaps 
it is particularly incoherent in the context of assessing Terry. 
Terry asks the question at the heart of criminal procedure: what 
is the correct balance between government intrusion and indi-
vidual autonomy? There can be no answer to this question that 
isn't shaped by time, place, vantage point, and a host of interac-
tive, evolving societal forces. 
What systems would have been affected if Terry hadn't 
been decided? Police departments, obviously. One variable is 
the trajectory of police behavior in the face of a lack of Supreme 
13. See, e.g., David Kocicniewski, Success of Elite Police Unit Exacrs a Toll on the 
Street, N.Y. Times AI (Feb. 15, 1999) (citing statistic that of over 45 thousand frisks per-
formed by the NYPD Street Crimes Unit, under 10 thousand turned up any weapons.) 
14. Sec, e.g., Elizabeth Kolbcrt, The Perils of Safety, The New Yorker 50, 52 
(March 22, 1999) (though stop and frisk looks like a racially neutral tactic, in practice in 
New York it has resulted in thousands upon thousands of young black and Latino men 
getting searched for weapons). 
IS. See, e.g., the "special needs" cases, including Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) and Vernonia School District 471 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 
(1995) (drug testing). 
16. It seemed appropriate to mix a football metaphor with my discussion of chaos 
theory, since football is another area about which I know very little. 
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Court guidance. Police would continue to stop and frisk sus-
pects, with most of the impact occurring in poor and minority 
neighborhoods. The President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment noted in 1967 that this differential treatment, this accrual 
of petty and not so petty humiliations, was taking its toll on the 
affected neighborhoods. The report also noted that it was pre-
dictable that such police-citizen encounters would occasionally 
escalate, and particularly in the broader context of continuing 
mistreatment, would occasionally lead to serious civil distur-
bances.17 Would police departments have responded to escalat-
ing tensions by generating internal regulations or changing their 
training and disciplinary regimes? This would depend on the 
pressures they faced and the action or inaction of local, state and 
federal legislative, administrative and other political bodies. 
Perhaps they would have felt more need to do so in the absence 
of Supreme Court action. 
The behavior (and to some extent the actual composition) 
of policymaking bodies, in turn, would have been heavily influ-
enced by public perceptions and attitudes. 18 For example, if the 
conventional wisdom is that Richard Nixon was elected in some 
significant part because of public reaction to the Warren Court's 
perceived pro-criminal, pro-minority stance, it is difficult to 
gauge what effect silence from the Court in the face of escalating 
police abuse might have had on electoral outcomes and political 
policymaking. Would it have led to more sympathy for poorly 
treated minorities, or to even greater fear of crime? To wide-
spread indignation on behalf of innocent, hardworking citizens 
brutalized and humiliated by arrogant cops, or on behalf of 
hardworking, working class cops trying to do their jobs under 
dangerous circumstances? How would those perceptions have 
affected public behavior at the polls, or the behavior of elected 
officials? And where would they fit within the context of all the 
other shifting social and economic factors that made the political 
landscape during the Warren Court very different from that of 
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts? 
Absent Terry, lower courts, lacking guidance, would con-
tinue generating contradictory decisions that called the scope of 
basic fourth amendment principles (such as search, seizure, con-
17. Brief of NAACP at 62-68 (cited in note 6) citing The President's Commission 
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police 
(1967). 
18. Which in tum would be influenced by the Court's behavior-its decision to 
place its imprimatur on certain practices and to treat others as beyond its purview. 
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sent, and probable cause) into question and gave little guidance 
to street level cops. Stop and frisk statutes were being passed 
and needed to be evaluated.19 Such uncertainty would lead to 
some sort of reaction, though not necessarily from the judiciary. 
It is also difficult to predict what the lack of Terry would 
mean for the course of Supreme Court precedent. How would it 
have affected Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, or criminal 
procedure jurisprudence? Would it have led to more expansive 
definitions of probable cause or consent, greater tolerance of 
pretextual grounds for police intrusion, or narrower definitions 
of search and seizure?20 But why assume any particular amend-
ment or set of amendments is a discrete system? Perhaps, if not 
for Terry, the Court might eventually have dealt with the issues 
of unequal treatment raised by stop and frisk through the equal 
protection clause, for example. 
It is said that Terry was a response to hydraulic pressures 
building up in the Warren Court in the aftermath of Brown v 
Board of Education, Brown v. Allen, Mapp and Miranda, and 
that the Court felt it could not afford another anti-police, pro-
minority decision.21 To the extent the Court did see itself as 
having a finite amount of capital to expend, and to the extent it 
had an overall plan for spending it, who knows what the lack of 
Terry would have done to that accounting. But this analysis 
treats the Warren Court, if only for descriptive purposes, as a 
discrete system. Like any other court, the Warren Court was it-
self an unstable and evolving system.22 It (and its successor 
courts) evolved through inevitable changes in personnel, leader-
ship, vision, and political context. Its decisions evolved through 
the common law process, the vagaries of individual cases, the 
makeup and interpretations of lower courts, and all the other 
obvious variables that make the path of the law unpredictable. 
19. Barrett, 72 St. John's L. Rev. at 760 (cited in note 11). 
20. Interestingly, all of these came to pass anyway. Sec, c,g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213 (1983) (lowering probable cause threshold); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 
U.S. 218 (1973) (adopting broad definition of consent); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 
170 (1984) (adopting narrow definition of search); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) 
(adopting narrow definition of seizure); and Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) 
(holding evidence of pretext irrelevant). 
21. Maclin, 72 St. John's L. Rev. at 1318 (cited in note 7) (citing Justice Douglas's 
dissent in Terry). 
22. Sec Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really so Defense-Minded?), The 
Burger Coun (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, 
in Vincent Blasi, ed., The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't 62, 62-68 
(Yale U. Press, 1983) (critiquing the notion of a unitary Warren Court). 
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A question like "what if Terry hadn't been decided?" seems 
to assume a stable environment, a jigsaw puzzle with one piece 
removed. But, in Ron Allen's and Ross Rosenberg's insightful 
description, the common law system is a "grown" rather than a 
"made" system;23 a system with too many variables to yield any 
sort of predictive certainty.24 This point holds true for all the 
other interlocking systems discussed above. There is no overall 
top-down plan. And there are no discrete systems at work here 
either, just a complex set of forces, actions and reactions, causes, 
effects and feedback loops, all in constant flux. 
Was Terry wrongly decided? Yes. It didn't achieve what it 
set out to; it never faced the racial issues that have, if anything, 
worsened; and it arguably placed its imprimatur on an abusive 
set. of practices. In the bargain it seriously damaged the struc-
ture of Fourth Amendment law, allowing for an ad hoc, unprin-
cipled balancing whose costs go far beyond the excesses of stop 
and frisk. Would we have been better off without it? That de-
pends. 
23. Ronald J. Allen and Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Lim-
its of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 St. Johns L. Rev. 1149, 
1189-98 (1998) 
24. See also Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 110, 
113-14 (1991). 
